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Abstract
We provide a new characterization of the Copeland solution, based
on the number of steps in which candidates beat each other. A Con-
dorcet winner is a candidate which beats every other contender in
one step. In other words, given m candidates, a Condorcet winner
beats all remaining contenders in a total of m  1 steps. When choos-
ing from a tournament, there is universal agreement on the Condorcet
principle which requires to pick the Condorcet winner, whenever it ex-
ists. As a Condorcet winner may fail to exist, the Condorcet principle
can be extended to what we call the minisum principle: Choose the
candidate(s) who beat all remaining contenders in the smallest total
number of steps. We show that the minisum principle characterizes
the Copeland solution.
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1 Overview
In solving the problem of choosing from a tournament, Copeland (1951)
proposes to pick the candidates which beat the highest number of contenders.
The proposal of Copeland received attention from a variety of elds, including
biology as in Landau (1953); graph theory as in Van den Brink and Gilles
(2003); economics as in Paul (1997); computer science as in Singh and Kurose
(1991) and social choice theory as in Moulin (1986). As a result, it has been
the subject matter of thourough investigations and we know, at present,
many of its properties.1
However, the literature is not very rich in characterizations of the
Copeland solution. In fact, the original proposal of Copeland (1951) is not
supported by a characterization. Later, Moon (1968) shows the equivalence
between the Copeland ranking and the one generated by the maximum likeli-
hood solution of Zermelo (1929) which assigns a strengthto each alternative
and derives the social ranking accordingly. The rst axiomatic characteri-
zation of the Copeland solution is by Rubinstein (1980) who characterizes
the Copeland welfare functionas a method to rank the participants of a
tournament. Henriet (1985) extends this characterization to environments
which allow ties between candidates. Moreover, he gives three characteriza-
tion of the Copeland choice rulewhich chooses among the participants of
a tournament. As far as we know, these are the only characterizations of the
Copeland solution, all of which use its invariance to the reversal of a cycles
orientation.
We provide a new characterization based on the number of steps in which
candidates beat each other. A Condorcet winner is a candidate which beats
every other contender in one step. In other words, given m candidates, a
Condorcet winner beats all remaining contenders in a total of m   1 steps.
When choosing from a tournament, there is universal agreement on the Con-
dorcet principle which requires to pick the Condorcet winner, whenever it
exists. As a Condorcet winner may fail to exist, the Condorcet principle
can be extended to what we call the minisum principle: Choose the can-
didate(s) who beat all remaining contenders in the smallest total of steps.
Interestingly, the minisum principle characterizes the Copeland solution.
Section 2 introduces the basic notions. Section 3 states our results.
1One can see Laslier (1997) for a detailed exposition of tournament solutions, including
the one proposed by Copeland.
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2 Basic Notions
Let X be a nite set of candidates with #X  3. By a tournament over
X, we mean a complete and asymmetric binary relation over X. We write
 for the set of tournaments over X.2 A tournament solution is a mapping
f :  ! 2Xnf;g. For each T 2 , let T (x) = #fz 2 X : xTzg be
the number of alternatives that x directly beats. The Copeland rule is the
tournament solution  dened as (T ) = fx 2 X : T (x)  T (y) 8y 2 Xg.
For any natural number n, we write In = f0; 1; :::ng for the set that
consists of zero and the natural numbers from 1 to n. Given any tournament
T 2  and any x; y 2 X, a path from x to y in T is a sequence fxigi2In
 X of alternatives with x0 = x and xn = y such that xiTxi+1 8i 2 Innfng.
We refer to n as the lenght of the path. Let T (x; y) be the lenght of the
shortest path from x to y in T , i.e., the lenght of any path from x to y in T
is at least T (x; y). We set T (x; y) = #X, when T admits no path from x
to y and T (x; x) = 0. If T (x; y) = 1, then xTy, in which case x directly
beats y. A Condorcet winner is a candidate which directly beats all other
contenders. Given any T 2 , let sT (x) =
P
y2X T (x; y) be the sum of the
shortest paths lengths from x 2 X to all remaining contenders. We write
(T ) = fx 2 X : sT (x)  sT (y) 8y 2 Xg for the set of minisum candidates.
We characterize the Copeland solution in terms of this minisum principle.
3 The Characterization
Following Miller (1980), given any tournament T 2  and any distinct x; y 2
X, we say that y covers x in T i¤ x T z =) y T z 8z 2 X. We write
U(T ) = fx 2 X : @y 2 X which covers x in Tg for the uncovered set of T .
The transitivity of the covering relation ensures U(T ) 6= ?. As Miller (1980)
shows, when T does not admit a Condorcet winner, we have U(T ) = fx 2
X : T (x; y) 2 f1; 2gg, i.e., the uncovered set consists of the candidates which
beat every other contender in at most two steps. This is an extension of the
Condorcet principle through the requirement of minimizing the maximum
2So given any T 2  and any distinct x; y 2 X, precisely one of x T y and y T x holds.
We understand completeness in the weak sense where x T x holds for no x 2 X.
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number of steps. We call this the maximin principle.3 So the uncovered set
is equivalent to the maximin principle.
The literature admits various solutions that rene the uncovered set.
Proposition 3.1 below quotes a result of Miller (1980) which shows that the
Copeland solution is a renement of the uncovered set.
Proposition 3.1 (T )  U(T ) at each T 2  while  6= U .
As shown below, the set of minisum candidates also renes the uncovered
set.
Proposition 3.2 (T )  U(T ) at each T 2 .
Proof. Take any x 2 (T ). So sT (x)  sT (y) 8y 2 X. Suppose,
there exists c 2 X that covers x. By the denition of the covering relation
and the denition of the shortest path, we have T (c; z)  T (c; z) for all
z 2 Xnfx; cg. Thus Pz2Xnfx;cg T (c; z)  Pz2Xnfx;cg T (x; z). Moreover,
as c covers x, we have c T x, implying T (c; x) = 1 < T (x; c). Hence,P
z2X T (c; z) <
P
z2X T (x; z) which means sT (c) < sT (x), contradicting
sT (x)  sT (y) 8y 2 X. Thus, there exists no c 2 X that covers x, hence
x 2 U(T ):
In fact, the set of minisum candidates coincides with the set of Copeland
winners.
Theorem 3.1 (T ) = (T ) at each T 2 .
Proof. Take any T 2 . To show (T )  (T ), take any x 2 (T ) 
U(T ). As x 2 U(T ), for any y 2 Xnfxg, we have T (x; y) = 1 if x T y
and T (x; y) = 2 if y T x. So sT (x) = #fy 2 X : xTyg + 2:#fy 2 X :
yTxg = T (x) + 2(n   1   T (x)) = 2n   2   2T (x). As x 2 (T ), hence
T (x)  T (y) 8y 2 X, we have sT (x)  sT (y) 8y 2 X, implying x 2 (T ).
To show (T )  (T ), take any y 2 (T )  U(T ). As T (x; z) 2 f1; 2g and
T (y; z) 2 f1; 2g for all z 2 X and sT (x)  sT (y), we have T (x)  T (y),
which by denition of  implies x 2 (T ).
As the Copeland rule (which is equivalent to the minisum principle) re-
nes the uncovered set (which is equivalent to the maximin principle), tour-
nament solutions exemplify a case where the minisum principle renes the
maximin principle - a fact which is not common in the literature.4
3Shepsle and Weingast (1984) call this the two step principle.
4See Brams et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion of these two principles.
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